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When the disturbances in a system of demand equations satisfy a vector autoregressive
process, the standard tests for regularity (e.g. homogeneity and symmetry) do not have
the correct size since they are based on an inconect maintained hypothesis of spherical
disturbances. The maximum likelihood estimation of the autocorrelated system is usually
very costly; this has probably led most empirical researchers to ignore the problem. We
wish to illustrate its potential seriousness with a number of applications, based on the
Rotterdam system and the AIDS system. To this end, we propose a generic procedure,
based on the Lagrange multiplier principle, for testing any possible combination of absence
of serial correlation, homogeneity, and symmetry against any possible alternative which
specifies autocorrelation of an arbitrary given order. In most cases, the statistic is shown
to simplify to an easily computed trace. We also present a general, and explicit, estima-
tion procedure for the maximum likelihood estimation of an allocation system under any
possible combination of serial correlation, homogeneity, and symmetry. This procedure
contains, as a special case, the, estimation of the system without the regularity constraints.
Our uwnericrtl results suggest that taking sutocorrelation into accowtt generally decrcases
the test statistics for regularity.
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Section 1. Introductiont
The pioneering work of Berndt and Savin (1975) and Lau (1978) made the profession aware that the
adding-up condition has important consequences for the specification of dynamic error processes
in allocation syatems (multivariate linear regression models with singular error covariance matrix).
Berndt and Savin recognized that the only vector autoregressive processes compatible with adding-
up are those in which the matrices R~ of autocorrelation ccefficients satisfy i'R~ - k~s', where : is
a column vector of ones and k~ is an unknown constant. This condition was later proved by Lau
(1978) to be necessary and sufficient for adding-up to hold in a dynamic allocation system.
Betndt and Savin (1975) also present a procedure, based on the work of Hendry (1971), for
the maximum likelihood (ML) eatimation of dynamic allocation systems. As usual, this proce-
dure involves the deletion of an equation; the estimatea are invariant with respect to the index
of the deleted equation. They also show that the matrices R~ oí autocorrelation ecefficients are
not identifiable without further restrictions. This does not present a problem insofar as the pri-
mary parameters of interest are the ccefficients oí the observable variables (e.g. price and income
c[~ÍÍirie.ntF) rather than lhc clements of R~.
One implication of the Berndt-Savin results is the inadequacy of those tests for autocorrelation
that are based on the residuals of a single equation, auch as the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic
(the single equation DW test has, however, been used in the empirical literature on allocation sys-
tems; see, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)). The correct procedure involves jointly testing for
autocorrelation in the full system, taking into account the restrictions on R~ implied by adding-up.
If one is willing to assume that the matrices Rj are diagonal, adding-up implies R~ - p~I; since
the autocorrelation coefficients are then identícal across all equations, it would appear reasonable
(though not rigorous) to compute a single DW statistic from the pooled residuals of the entire
system. Usually, however, the model attempts to explain the demand for heterogeneous commodi-
ties (e.g. food and housing); in this instance an assumption of equa] correlation coefficients across
commodities is clearly unattractive. It is then much more appealing to test a model with spherical
disturbances against a model where the matrices R~ are not restricted in any way. One may for
this purpose use the likelihood ratio test, in the fashion of Berndt and Savin; or the more recent
Lagrange multiplier {LM) test statistic initially proposed by Aitchison and Silvey (1960) and later
investigated by Godfrey (1978) and Breusch and Pagan (1980) in the context of dynamic error
pr(1foFRCF. AF has oftcn hcrn pointed out, an important advantaqc of the latter test is that it
only mquir~a ~stimation undi,r the~ null hypothesis: this ie of importance ín our case since thez
autocorrelated system is costly to estimate, as will become apparent in the sequel of this paper.
Ofeven greater importance than a test for serial correlation is testing the regularity restrictions
implied by economic theory (such as homogeneity and symmetry). Such regularity tests have
almost always been conducted under the maintained hypothesis of no autocorrelation. But if
this maintained hypothesis is incorrect, it follows from the work of White (1982) that the tests
of regularity will generally be of incorrect size. One may then either use the robust statistics
proposed by White, or conduct classical tests for regularity in the autocorrelated model. The
latter procedure may have better small-sample properties.
The fact that the usual regulazity tests should be validated by a preliminary test for autocor-
relation was recognized by Berndt and Savin (1975). In their numerical example, the likelihood
ratio test statistic for symmetry is reduced by a factor of two when allowance is made for first-
order serial correlation with a diagonal R'. Unfortunately, the authors did not proceed to test
for symmetry in the fully correlated model (unrestricted R"), even though they strongly reject the
null hypothesis of zero cross-correlation ccefficients.
The previous remarks illustrate the need for a systematic investigation ofall possiblejoint tests,
and for the elaboration of a rigorous testing strategy. In particular, one may test for regularity
with, or without, the maintained hypothesis o( autocorrelation of any given order; and one may
test for autocorrelation with, or without, the maintained hypotheses of homogeneity and symmetry
(it is, in fact, possible that homogeneity and symmetry introduce autocorrelation into an otherwise
spherical model). Use of the LM principle ensures that for most of these tests, it is not necessary
to estimate the autocorrelated model; it will be seen in fact that in most cases, the LM test does
not require the inversion of inordinately large matrices, even though the regression equation may
be nonlinear under the maintained hypothesis.
The aim of this paper is twofold. We will first present a general, and explicit, estimation
procedure for the ML estimation of an allocation system with autocorrelated errors, homogeneity,
and symmetry. This procedure contains, as a special case, the estimation of the system without
the regularity conetraints. We will then present a generic procedure, based on the LM principle,
for testing any possible combination of absence of serial correlation, homogeneity, and symmetry
against any possiblc alternative which specifies autocorrelation of an arbitrary given order.
When the regularity restrictions are homogeneity and symmetry, a list of all possible tests
of llo against Il~ is provided in Tab1e 1. In the row and column headings of Table 1, A denotes
the aóaence of autocorrelation; 11 denotes homogeneity; S denotes symmetry; and the bars denote3
logical negation. The list involves 12 tests rather than 8 x 8- 64, since symmetry and adding-up
imply homogeneity and since f!o must be nested within Hl.
TABLE 1: LIST OF POSSIBLE JOINT TESTS
Aa
AHS AH~ Afl~ ÁHS ÁH~`
AHS Test no. 1
AÁ~ Test no. 2 Test no. 3
Hr ÁHS Test no. 4
ÁH~ Test no. 5 Test no. 6 Test no. 7
ÀÍI~ Test no. 8 Test no. 9 Test no. 10 Test no. 11 Test no. 12
It is important to note that in each column of Table 1, the various testa should be performed
in order of increasing restrictiveness under the alternative, i.e. Test 9 should be performed before
Test 6 for example (it may also be said that a nonsignificant result in Test 9 va(idatea the use of
Test 6). Indeed, in this instance, it is only when the joint hypothesis of no autocorrelation and of
homogeneity (AIIST) is not rejected against the fully unrestricted alternative (dÍ~~) that one can
be confident in the proper specification of ÁfIS, so that Test 6 has the proper size. If Test 9 does
not reject, then Test 6 should have more power than Test 9, since it is based on a smaller (but
probably still correct) alternative.
It should also be noted that the LM tests in the first three columns of Table 1 require signif-
icantly less computation than the tests in the last two. In fact, it will be shown that the generic
formula tor the twelve tests reduces to an easily computed trace in cases 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10
of Table 1.
The previous remazks suggest the following strategy for jointly testing the regulazity restric-
tions (HS) of economic theory. First perform sequentially Tests 10, 9, 6, 8, 5, and 4, in that
ordor. ]f at any stage of this procedure, the nul! hypothesis is rejected, proceed to estimate the
fully autocorrelated model and perform Test 11. If none of the six tests rejects, perform Test 2.
It should be clear that this testing strategy would be prohibitively expensive if Wald or likelihood
ratio tests, rather than Lagrange multiplier tests, were used.
A brief plan o( the~ paper follows. In Section 2, we will present generic expressions for the4
maximum likelihood estimation of an allocation system under the six possible combinations of
constraints ( AII S, AN.~`, AFI S`, ÁiI S, ÁH ~, ÁHS). Generic formulas for the gradient of the
loglikelihood and for the iuformation matrix are given in Section 3. 'Che generic I,M test statistic
is stated, and shown to simplify considerably in cases 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 of Table 1(this result
was pteviously shown by Berndt and Savin (1977) only in the first three cases, where the model
is linear under the alternative and the null). A simplification also occurs when A is interpreted
as autocorrelation with diagonal, but not necessarily null, matrices of correlation coefficients. In
this case the model is only slightly more difficult to estimate than the fully uncorrelated model
(the Aitken transformation of the data matrices can be performed elementwise, in Cochrane-Orcutt
fashion). Section 4 illustrates the methodology by estimating the AIDS model in levels (Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980)) and the Rotterdam model (Theil (1975); Barten (1969)) with quarterly British
data. In the case otthe AIDS system, seasonal factors induce a very high degree of serial correlation,
which can be adequately modeled by specifying disturbances of the form ui - Rju~-i ~R~u~-~ ~e~.
Section 5 concludes.
Section 2. R.estricted and unrestricted maximum likelihood eatimation
As shown by Berndt and Savin (1977), any dynamic allocation system satiafying the maintained
(and untestable) restriction of adding-up may be written without loss of generality as:
Y-BXtU (1)
` v
U- L, RiU-i t E (2)
~-i
where Y is an n x T matrix of T observations on n dependent variables, B is an n x k matrix of
ccefficients, X is a k x T matrix of T observations on k regressors, U and E are n x T matrices
of current disturbances, tlie R~ are n x n matrices of autocorrelation coefficients, and the U-~
are n x T matrices of lagged disturbances. We will assume that vecE ~ N(0, IT ~ E), where E
is a positive definite matrix of order n. It is emphasized that (1) and (2) are interpreted as an
incomplete allocation system, after the deletion of an equation; so that, typically, n is the total
number of commodities in a demand system minus one.2 Upon substituting U-; - Y;- BX-~














Xl - . (6)
`r-D
U-Y-BX (7)
U-1 Y-r - BX-1
U-2 Y-z - BX-~
Ul - - - Yi - (lo ~ B)Xl, (g)
U-, Y y - BX-P
we may rewrite Equation (3) as:
U-RUIfE.
Similarly, if we note that:
v v
vec (~ RiBX-i) -~(X' i ~ Ri)vec B
i-1 i-1
and that vec(BX) - (X'e I„)vecB, we may express Equation (3) as:
(9)
D
vec(}'-IZ)'r)- ((X'~In)-~(X'i ~Ri))vecl3-}vec F,. (10)
j-1
It is imm,~diati~ly appar,~nt frum (9) U,at th~~ maximurn likolihix,d ,,r;timator o( R is:
R - UU~(UIUi)-1
(aee Hendry (1971)). In order to impose homogeneity and symmetry on vecB in ( 10), we use
the methodology presented in Deschamps ( 1988). If we let B -(C ~ S ~ s), where (S ~ s) is an
n x(n t 1) matrix ot price coefficients and where s is the last column of B, homogeneity and
symmetry are stated, respectively, as Srn --s and S- S'. We define:
~(k-n-1)xll
Dli - !k-1 I , and: (12)
DS - j~k'"-1) D (13) ( O L
-tn6
where L is an n2 x n(n t 1)~2 matrix such that vecS equals L times the stacked lower triangle
of S(fot an explicit form of L, see Balestra (1976); and for an algorithm generating a compact
computer representation of L, see Deschampa ( 1988)). In the case where S is 2 x 2, L has the
following form:
0 1 0
0 1 0 '
0 0 1
With these definitions, we may impose the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions on vecB
as:
whcre:
vec B - (D'y ~ I„)DS6 (14)
ó' -(vec'C S~~ Szr Sx2 Sst S3s Ss3 ... Snn )
is a vector of unconstrained parameters.
Upon substituting vecB -(D'H ~ I„)DS6 into Equation (10), we see immediately that the
ML estima.tor of 6 is:
r











where R is given by (11) with Ul replaced by lJr - Yr -(Io~B)Xr, and where R~ is the appropriate
block of R.
It is straightforward to check that Equation ( 15) can be simplified as:
b - (Z'(IT ~ È-~ )Z)-~ Dsvec(É'r(Y - RYr)X'D'tr - ~ R~È-t(Y - RY~)X' ~D'H). (19)
~-i
In order to impose homogeneity only, it suffices to replace DS in (16) and (19) by an identity
matrix of order n(k - 1), which reduces Fquation ( 14) to B- B~fD~~ with B~~ -(C ~ S). Of
course, 6 is then redefiued as vecl)y. Similarly, Equatione ( 16) and (19) imply unconatrained
estimation when DS and Dlr are replaced by identity matrices; 6 is in this case redefined as vecB.
We summarize our results in the following theorem.Theorem 1. The maximwn likelihood estimation of (1)-(2) under homogeneity and symmetry
implies the solution of Equations (I1), (17), and (19) with Z, B and E given by (16), (12)-(14),
and (18), respectively. Estimation under homogeneity requires the solution of Equations (11), (17),
and (19) with Z and E given by (16) and (18), and with B given by (12), (19) and by Ds - ~n(k-1).
Unconstrained estimation requires the solution of (11), (17), and (19) with Z and E given by (16)
and (18), and with 6- vecB .
If we assume uncorrelated disturbances, Equation (11) is replaced by R- O, and formulas
(1R) and (19) are considerably simplified (aee Deschamps (1988)). The system also becomes much
simpler if we assume that R~ - p~ln, since (9) may be written in this case as:
U-~PiU-ifE
~-i
with U and U-~ given by (7) and (8). The ML estimates of the p~ are then the GLS ccefficient
estimates in the regression of vecU on (vecU-i,...,vecU-p). Furthermore, it is straightforwazd to
check that Equations (18) and (19) respectively simplify to:
É-Y.-BX. (18')
i
b - (D's(DHX.X,D'y ~ Ë-r)Ds)- D'svec (É-IY.X;D'y) (19')
with Y, - Y-~~-t PiY i and X. - X-~~-t PiX-i-8
Section 3. Joint tests for autocorrelation, homogeneity, and symmetry
It is well-known that tor liucar models of the form z- 7,b } vecE, with vecE ~ N(0, IT ~ E), the
gradient of the (unconcentrated) loglikelihood L(b, E) with respect to b is given by:
8L - Z~(IT ~ E-r )(x - Zb) - Z~v~ ÍE-tE). 86
The in(ormation matrix is also well-known to be block-diagonal. lJnder regularity assumptions,
the block of this matrix corresponding to b is:
Z66 -~
aL aI. Zi(
fT ~ F.-t )Z. áb áb~ -
When the regression equation is nonlinear, as in (3), it follows immediately that if we may
write:
z- Zb } vecE and z~ - Zle } vecE
where (z, Z) does not involve b and (x~, Zr) dces not involve c, then the gradient of the loglikelihood
with respect to a -(b, c) is equal to:
8L - ( Z'vec (E-t E)1
8a `Zjvec (E-tE) J
and that the first diagonal block of the information matrix is:
Zn.. -
71(IT ~ r-~ )Z Z~(IT ~ E-~ )71
~,Í (IT ~ F.-~ )Z Zj(IT ~ ~-~ )ZI
Z66 Z6c (.LD) - ~
Z6c zcc
It is immediately clear, upon examination of (9), ( 10), and (14), that the preceding develop-
ments apply to our model if we define 6 as in Section 2, c- vecR, Z as in (16), and Zr -(Ui ~In).
It follows that:3
~L - r Dsvec (E-t EX'D'y -~~-r R~~-r EX' ~D'r~) ~
aa I` vec E-t EUi
D
z66 - ~S ~( DHX ~ E-' ) - ~(~yX-~ ~ RjE-~ )) x
j-l
F
((X~DH ~ I„) - ~(X~ iDH ~ R;))~s
~-i
v l
zn~ - ~s~Í~yXUi ~ E-t)- ~(DxX-iUi ~ Ri~-~))
~-i





Our generic Lagrange multiplier test statistic follows immediately from the above results.
Following Breusch and Pagan (1980), it may be written as:
LM - ~8a(áo))~Zaá(áo) (8a(ao)) (25)
where áo denotes the ML estimate of(B ~ R) under the null óypothesis. For the 12 tests mentioned
in Table I ot Section 1, the dimension of a will vary according to the alternative Hl, since a- 6
when the maintained hypothesis includes A (i.e. R - O) and since we have b- vecB, 6-
vec(C ~ S), or 6~ - (vec~C Sti Stz Ss~ .. . Snn) when the maintained hypothesis specifies
H~, H3`, or HS, respectively. Since, as was seen in Section 2, the specification of Íí~ and H~
result from replacing Ds and Dy by Ink and Ik in the first case and DS bY In(k-1) in the second
case, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The LM test statistic for the twelve cases in Table 1 is given by Equation (25).
e(áo) and Zaa(áo) are generated according to (8), (11)-(18), (20)-(24), and according to the
following rules:
1. If II~ includes A, set It and R equal to O in (15), (16), (18), (21), (12), and (23). Otherwise
set R- R and use F,quation (11).
2. If H~ includes A, replace Zs~ and Z~~ in (20) by empty matrices and let 8L~8a - 8L~8b.
Otherwise let óL~Ba, Zb~ and Z~~ be as in (21), (23), and (24).
3. IfHo includes H, define Dy by Equation (12) in (14) to (16). Otherwise define Dy - Ik in
(14) to (16).
4. If Hi includes H, define Dy by Equation (12) in (21) to (23). Otherwise define DH - Ik in
(21) to (23).
5. If Hp includes S, define DS by Equation (13) in (14) to (16). Otherwise let, in (14) to (16),
DS - Ink if No includes A and DS - In(k-1) if Ho includes H.
6. If Hl includes S, define DS by Equation (13) in (21) to (23). Otherwise let, in (21) to (23),
Ds - Ink if Hl includes FI and Ds - In(k-1) if Hl includes N.
Since in the first thrce cases of Table 1, the model is linear both under the null and under the
alternative, we have the following theorem, due to Berndt and Savin (1977).
Theorem 3. Ifboth llo and ll~ includr. A, then:
LM - Ttr (Éó'(Èo - E~)) (26)10
where Ëo and ct are thc bfL estimators of E under Ho and Ht, respectively.
Equation (26) obviously presents a definite advantage over Equation (25) since it only requires
the inversion of an n x n matrix. We will now show that similar simplifications occur in cases 5,
6, 8, 9, and 10 of Table 1(the largest matrix to be inverted is of order max(k, np)).
Theorem 4. Define:
Qx - X'(XX')'t X
~lz - X'D'H(DHXX'D'H)-'DHX
11-Y-l1nX
Ut - Yi - (!p t~ Bo)Xt
Ë - UU'~T
Q - U'È-t ll
r
Ql - Ul (~1(!T -Qx)Ul)~ Ul
1
Q~ - Ul (Ut(!T -QX)Ul)- Ul
where Bo is the ML estimate of B under Ho. The Lagrange multiplier test statistic (25) is given,
for the tests numbered 8, 9, and ]0 in Ta61e l, by:
LM - tr ~Q(Qx(!T -F QtQx - 2Qt) t Qt)~ (27)
and for the tesls numbererl 5 and 6`in Table 1 by:
LA1 - tr ~Q(QX(!T f QHQX - 2QH) f QH)~. (28)
Furthermore, for the tests numbered 6 and 10, the statistic simplifies respectively to LM -
tr(QQH) and to LM - tr(QQt).
Proof: Since (28) results írom replacing X by DHX in Qx and Qt, it suffices to prove that the
LM statistic (25) reduces to Equation (2?) for the tests numbered 8, 9, and 10. In these cases Hr
specifies unconstrained estimation, so that Rules 4 and 6 in Theorem 2 prescribe replacing DS by
I„k and Dy by !k in (21) to (23). Furthermore Ho specifies no serial correlation, so that Rule 1
prescribes replacing R by O in (21) to (23). We may then write (20) and (21) as:
8L - rvec E~tEX'1
80 `vec E-t EUi J
(29)
( X X' X U{ 1 ~ E-t (30) zoe -
`U~ X' UtU( J11
By the partitioned inversion tormula, we have:
~ Z66 Z6c
Zoa ' Zc6 Zcc ~ ~ E,
with:
t
Z" - ~fír (!7. - X'(XX')-~,j') U~~
-









8L ' ~ 8L ~ ~ ~ ~ i , vec (EX'Zba ~- EU{Zc6) ~a~~ Zaa ~a~~ -(vec E- EX vec E- EU~ )(vec (EX'Zb` f EU{Z")) ` `
- tr (XE'E-lEX'Zbb f XE'E-lEU1Z`b t UlE'E-'EX'Z"` f UlE'E-IEU~Z")
- tr (XE'E-~EX'Z6b f 2XE'E-~EUiZc6.} UiE'E-lEU1Z"~
- tr (E'E-lEX'Z6bX t2E'E-IEUiZc6X f E'E-IEU~Z"Ul)
- tr (F,'E-rE(X'Z6bX } 2U~Zc6X t U~Z"U~)). (36)
We now uso thc~ dc~finitions in the statoment of the theorem, replace U~ by U~, and replace,
according to Rule 1 in Theorem 2, E by E- U- Y- BoX in (36). We see that:
X'Z6bX - QX f QxQ1~vGX
UiZc6X - -QiQx
Uiï"Ui - Qi
and Equation (27) follows Irom (36) and from the symmetry of Q, Q1, and Q.x, which impliea:
tr (~lQiQx) - tr (~l~(dxQ) - tr (GlQxQi).
Lastly, Equation (27) simplifies to tr(QQ1) for Test 10 in Table 1, since in this case Ba -
YX'(XX')-1 and U- Y(IT - Qx), so that QQx - O in (27). This concludes the proof of
Theorem 4. Q
We conclude this section with two remarks. First, in the case where the system consists of
a single equation, it is straightforward to verify that tr(QQ~) reduces to TR2, where RZ is the12
ccefficient of determination in a regression of the vector of OLS residuals u on (X,u-t,...,u-y)
(scr Ilreusch and I'agan ( 1980)). Secondly, it is easy to redefine the nufl hypothesis A as meaning
R~ - p~I„ for all j, rathcr than R~ - O for all j. It should be pointed out, however, that this
redefined null hypothesis is only slightly less restrictive than the total absence of serial correlation.
All the results ot Theorem 4 can be seen to apply to this case as well, upon replacing X by
X, - X-~~-t p~X-~ and Y by Y, - Y-~~-t p~Y-~, as in Equations ( 18') and (19~). Note, in
particular, that U- Y- f)oX must be replaced by E- Y, - f1oX,; the two are no longer equal
under the redefined mdl hypothesis.
Section 4. An empirical illustration
As announccd in the introduction, we will illustrate the preceding theory with an estimation on
quarterly British data of two well-known consumer demand systems. The first one is the AIDS
model (Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)):
w~r - a~ f À;t f~ ry;~ logPir -~ At log(xe~Pr) f u~e (37)
i
where p;r denotes the price of commodity i at time t; xi - ~~p~tq~t is total expenditure; w;r -
p;iq;~~xt is the budget share of commodity i; and logPi -~f w~rlogp~t. The second one is the
Rotterdam system (Theil (1975); Barten (1969)), given by:
w;i01og9u - a; f b; ~ wii~ logqi: f~ c;~Ologp~: f u;a (38)
i i
whcre wu -(wt, t w;,c-a)~2, Olog9~s - logqu - log4~,r-~, and OlogPu - logPu - logP~,e-e.
The models differ iu two substantial respects: firstly, they depend on two different parame-
terizations: for instance, the Rotterdam model assurnes constant coe(ficients b; - p;i(r7q;;~8xi),
wheroas thc Afl)S model assumes constant ~i; -(8w;i~alogxi) - p;i(8q;;~í)x~) - w;;. Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly in the present context, the AIDS model is in levela whereas the
Rotterdam model is in first ditferences; the properties of the disturbances u;; and u;i should there-
forc be quite different. Cousequently, any comparative estimation of the two systems should model
adequately the stochastic processes generating their respective disturbances. This will be amply
illustrated by our numerical results.
The quarterly expenditures on nine classes of consumption goods (Food; Alcoholic Drink
and Tobacco; Housing; Fuel and Light; Clothing and Footwear; Durable Household Goods; Cazs
and Motorcycles; Other Goods; Other Services) were taken trom the Economic Trenda Annual13
Supplement, 1983, for the period going from 1955 (Quarter 1) to 1982 (Quarter 2). Price indices
were taken from the Monthly Digest oj Statistica.
In order to keep the number of estimated parameters within reasonable bounds, we estimated
both models under the specification R-(Rt O O R~). For this alternative hypothesis, Test
number 10 of Table 1 yields Lagrange multiplier statiatics of 391.33 for the AIDS model and 281.57
for the Rotterdam model. Both aze highly significant, since the lq critical value of the Chi-square
distribution with 128 degrees of freedom is 168.13.
TABLE 2: LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS FOR REGULARITY
Model Test no. fIa Ht LR LRC CV1 CVS
AIDS 1 All S AH~ 112.40 98.35 48.28 41.34
AIDS 2 AIIS A113` 149.45 130.09 58.62 51.00
AIDS 3 All~ AfT~ 37.06 31.67 20.09 15.51
AIDS 11 ÀFIS dA3' 138.36 98.88 58.62 51.00
Rotterdam 1 AlIS ARS 86.50 76.10 48.28 41.34
Rottcrdam 2 AlIS AÍl3` 107.73 94.26 58.62 51.00
Rotterdam 3 A113` AIÍ3` 21.23 18.22 20.09 15.51
Rotterdam 7 ÀHS ÁH.~` 90.59 65.06 48.28 41.34
Rotterdam 11 ÁIIS ÁIÍ~` 96.86 69.08 58.62 51.00
Rotterdam 12 ÁIIS ÁÁS 6.27 4.36 20.09 15.51
LR - likelihood rntio test atatistic. LRC - likelihood rniio test statistic with amall-sample
correction. CVl - critical value, 1í~ significance level. CV5 - crtitical value, 5?b significance level.
Table 2 presents the likclihood ratio test statistics for regularity (Tests 1, 2, 3, 7, 11, and
12), both with and without small-sample corrections (Anderson (]958, pp. 207-210); Italianer
(1985)). "1'he regularity test statistics under the maintained hypothesis of no serial correlation
(Tests 1, 2, and 3) are given for comparison purposes only. It is emphasized that the small-sample
corrections have a rigorous theoretical basis only in the case o( Test number 3. In the part of
Table 2 that relates to the AIDS model, we could only perform Test number I1, due to the lack of
convergence ofall the optimization algorithms that were tried on the AIDS model with homogeneity
only (the information matrix became singulaz, and the likelihood function discontinuous, during14
the iterations). This problem can also occur in the single equation model if the autocorrelation
coefficient becomes arbitraríly close to one, and has also been encountered in other contexts; see
Quandt (1983, p. 744).
it is immediately apparent from Table 2 that taking autocorrelation into account systemati-
cally decrenxes the tests statistics for regularity. However, symmetry is slill rejected by all models,
even when heuristic small-sample corrections are made. Nevertheless, the change in the LR statistic
tor homogeneity in the Rotterdam system is quite dramatic: in the autocorrelated model, homo-
geneity is not rejected at the 38q significance level; in the model without correlation, it is rejected
at the 5q level, though not at the lqo level if the Anderson small-sample correction is made.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for the AIDS model under adding-up with and without serial
correlation, respectively. Tables 5 and 6 present the Rotterdam model under homogeneity. In the
case of the AIDS model, the differences are indeed quite substantial. Incidentally, the technique of
introducing seasonal constants and seasonally variable income coefficients (see Blundell and Ray
(1982)) does not fully deseasonalize the AIDS model: in this case, the LM test oí R- O against
R-(Rr RZ R3 R~) under the maintained hypothesis of adding-up yields a statistic of 435.11,
larger than the lq critical value of 311.56.
As mentioned at tbe beginníng of thia section, the different properties of the AIDS and Rot-
terdam disturbances provide an important check on the validity of our methodology. Indeed, it is
of interest to ascertain whether the marginal propensities to spend and the diagonal elements of
the Slutsky matrix implied by the two models are comparable (such a comparison would be mean-
ingless for the off-dia.gonal elements, since symrnetry is rejected). An approximate correspondence
between the ccefficients of the two models is given by:
b~ -Q;fw~d-rb;
2 ~ der
c~; ~ 7;; ~- A; log(~IR) - w; f w; - ci,
where log f' - ~~ w11og~J„ and where rB;, i, and j3j denote sample means.
Table 7 presents the b;, b; , c;;, and c;; in the models with and without serial correlation, both
estimated under adding-up. The corresponding elasticities (e;, e~, rl;;, rl„), obtained by dividing
6;, 6;, c;;, and c;; by w;, are also given. There is a reasonable agreement when serial correlation
is taken into account. Very substantial differences exist when it is not. For instance, the AIDS
model without serial correlation classifies Fuel~Light and Vehicles as inferior goods, and predicts an
incorrect sign for the own Slutsky coefficients in these two equations. It also improperly classifies
Drink~Tobacco and Other Goods as luxuries.15
Another observation in Table 7 is the surprisingly good performance of the Rotterdam model
without serial correlation. With the exception of Food and Services, the marginal propensities 6;
are quite close to the ones estimated when serial correlation ie taken into account. Furthermore, the
own price ccefficients in the equations for Housing, Clothing and Durables are virtually the same.
'I'his can be taken a.g evidence that the definition of the first difl'erences used in Equation (38) is
appropriate. Indeed, the likelihood ratio test statistic for autocorrelation in the Rotterdam model
with homogeneity is 167.07, slightly less than the lib critical value of 168.13 (but still significant
at the 5qo level). By contrast, the same statistic for the AIDS mode.l under adding-up is 854.46.
Space considerations do not allow us to report the full sets of autocorrelation ccefficients
(there are 128 such coefficients [or each model). The matrices R~ and R~ do not appear to be
diagonal: for the Rotterdam system, Ri includes nt,o - 5 significant diagonal elemente, and
n~,o - 8 significant ofí-diagonal elements; and R~ includes n~,p - 2 significant diagonal elements,
and n~,p - 14 significant off-diagonal elements. The corresponding figures for the AIDS model
are n~.p - 4, nt,o - 20, na,p - 7, and n~,o - 25. All the coefficients were less than one in
absolute value, some of them being quite close to unity: in the AIDS model, for instance, the
fourth and fifth diagonal elements of R~ were equal to 0.83 and 0.82, with "t-ratios~ of 14.14 and
12.00, respectively. This confirms our previous observation that autocorrelation is quite severe in
the case of AIDS.16
Section b. Concluaions
This paper has attempted to provide a methodology tor jointly testing autocorrelation and reg-
ularity in allocation systems. It has been argued that both issues cannot be treated separately.
Most o[ the tests that we propose require only the estimation of a linear allocation system, and
henre do not require an iuordinate amount of computational effort. By contrast, the estimation
of a large autocorrelated allocation system is quite diíï~cult, and convergence proved impossible to
obtain in one case.
It is unusual to include commodities such as Durablea and Vehicles in classical allocations sys-
tems such as (37) or (38), since the corresponding expenditurea have strong dynamic components.
Nevertheless, we have shown that the parameters of those equations can be plausibly estimated,
provided that autocorrelation is taken into account.
We have also shown that an allocation system can be reliably estimated from quarterly data;
t.he estimates presented in Tables 3 and 5 are both quite significant and plausible. We have argued
that the estimation technique underlying these estimates is superior to the mere introduction of
seasonal dummies. Indeed, these do not appear to fully deseasonalize the data.
Autocorrelation was found to be less severe in the Rotterdam model than in the AIDS model.
In fact, the estimated regression coefficients in the correlated and uncorrelated versions of the Rot-
terdam system are quite close. This is perhaps not too surprising since neglecting autocorrelation
produces consistent, albeit asymptotically inefficient, estimated coefficients. Nevertheless, Table 7
amply illustrates that severe inefficiency can produce results that are quite implausible. Further-
more, as shown in Table 2, the inconsistency of the estimated variances has serious consequences
on the various test statistics for tegularity.
Given the computational cost of obtaining our estimates, however, we do not advocate the
systematic estimation of autocorrelated allocation systems. It is much more appealing to reduce
autocorrelation by augmenting the list of reqressors, i.e. introducing conditioning variables or
price expectations in Equations (37) and (38). The various tests of Table 1 should enable the
investigator to ascertain whether the added explanatory variables fully account for the observed
dynamic behavior of the explained variables, and should therefore be quite useful in this context.17
TABLE 3: AUTOCORRELATED AIDS MODEL UNDER ADDING-UP
at Q~ ó~ ?ti 7~x 7~3
Food .1814 -.0862 -.0008 .0826 -.0187 -.0663
3.6995 -6.7164 -3.2237 6.9759 -2.1502 6.2310
Drink~Tob. .2911 -.Ofi99 .0011 -.0168 .0316 -.0744
6.7-t88 -5.3771 4.5439 -].3335 3.6246 -7.6442
liousing -.0177 -.0456 .0004 .0217 .0246 .0751
-.5071 -3.9849 2.3007 1.7640 2.9943 8.3207
Fuel~Light -.0028 -.0278 .0000 .0159 .0030 .0084
-.0504 -1.9824 .0320 1.2387 .3085 .7300
Clothing .2500 .0211 .0005 -.0`l61 .0018 -.0120
6.3472 2.0036 2.1408 -2.7975 .2702 -1.4670
Durables .0401 .0963 -.0010 .0326 -.0188 .0564
1.3868 10.7363 -6.4140 3.6542 -3.0753 8.6591
Vehicles -.0287 .2274 -.0018 -.0299 .0186 .0153
-.4015 11.4648 -4.5921 -1.60.58 1.3187 .9587
Oth. Goods .0669 -.0041 .0004 -.0292 .0097 .0101
1.7746 -.4354 2.0147 -3.2570 1.4364 1.2816
Oth. Serv. .2198 -.1112 .0012 -.0509 -.0517 -.0126
3.1837 -7.7494 3.2674 -3.8048 -5.2016 -1.0417
7~a 7~s 7~s 7~~ 7~s 7~s
Food -.0330 -.0257 .0119 .0079 .0203 .0309
-3.6193 -1.3455 .6800 .5142 1.2958 2.5020
Drink~Tob. -.0028 - .0007 -.0300 .0403 -.0155 .0234
-.3028 -.0350 -1.6523 2.4ï 17 -.9460 1.7120
Housing -.0209 .0495 -.0631 -.0466 -.0296 .0049
-2.2711 2.6257 -3.4522 -3.0201 -1.7596 .3509
F'uc~I~Liqbt .0295 .0056 -.0054 -.0309 -.0001 -.0199
2.9882 .`1686 -.2875 -1.8114 -.0085 -1.4952
Clothing -.0129 .0070 .0242 .0203 -.0219 -.0106
-1.8289 .4726 1.8050 1.6736 -1.7697 -1.0636
Durables .0087 -.0097 -.0217 -.0195 .0271 -.0421
1.3099 -.7098 -1.6606 -1.7251 2.2845 -4.1593
Vehicles .0599 -.0133 .0375 -.0290 -.0059 -.0088
4.1495 -.4581 1.3211 -1.1968 -.2374 -.4405
Oth. Goods -.004G .0215 -.0180 .0240 .0214 -.0232
-.6538 1.4755 -1.3079 2.1075 1.7864 -2.4194
Oth. Serv. -.0238 -.0341 .0647 .0336 .0045 .0455
-2.3291 -l .5542 3.2598 1.9561 .2564 3.2409
Loglikelihood - 919G.423. The figures show the estimated ccefficients and the ccefficients
divided by their estimated asymptotic standard errors.18
TABLE 4: UNCORRELATED AIDS MODEL UNDER ADDING-UP
~; Q; 6; 7;t ry;s 7;3
Food .2110 -.0966 -.0004 .0267 -.0259 -.0222
6.2479 -13.5048 -2.7668 1.7750 -2.6528 -2.1533
Drink~Tob. .2417 .1482 -.0009 .0066 .0901 -.0638
4.9989 14.4704 -4.0625 .3054 6.4418 -4.3236
Housing .0321 -.0755 .0009 .0204 .0128 .0415
1.2933 -19.3469 7.8075 1.8435 1.7742 5.4700
Fuel~Light -.1085 -.1036 .0004 -.0908 -.0876 -.0005
-1.1894 -5.3609 .9627 -2.2345 -3.3192 -.0181
Clothing .2102 .1828 -.0012 -.0072 -.0081 -.0252
4.2510 17.4506 -5.3868 -.3250 -.5690 -1.6666
Dnrables .070G .0552 -.0005 .0105 -.0636 .0135
2.2850 8.4243 -3.3112 .7659 -7.1071 1.4354
Vehicles .1G39 -.0936 .0010 .0992 -.0326 .0401
2.1796 -5.R74.5 2.8443 2.9623 -1.49G4 1.7487
Oth. Goods .1479 .0659 .0005 -.0476 .0012 -.0247
3.8118 8.0157 3.1517 -2.7560 .1059 -2.0861
Oth. Serv. .0310 -.0828 .0002 -.0179 .1137 .0412
.2GG7 -3.3588 .3480 -.3447 3.3789 1.1606
ry;a ry~s 7s 7;~ 7;s ry;s
Food .0394 .0157 .0532 .0227 -.0437 -.0625
3.2435 .6659 2.0553 .9520 -1.7981 -3.4251
Drink~Tob. -.0208 -.0352 -.0708 .0248 -.0091 .0716
-1.1939 -1.0415 -1.9120 .7272 -.2607 2.7406
Housing -.0311 .0172 -.0368 -.0225 -.0205 .0195
-3.4834 .9893 -1.9312 -1.2827 -1.1445 1.4553
Fuel~Light .1805 .0986 .0855 -.1538 -.0055 -.0042
5.5018 1.5476 1.2240 -2.3920 -.0843 -.0854
Clothing .0492 -.0483 .0324 -.0308 .0029 .0328
2.7656 -1.3983 .8544 -.8841 .0818 1.2278
Durables .0525 -.0209 .0371 -.0396 .0058 .0043
4.7284 -.9675 1.5659 -1.8173 .2608 .2580
Vehicles -.0545 -.0679 -.0322 .0603 .0902 -.1471
-2.0141 -1.2927 -.5589 1.1374 1.6658 -3.6183
Oth. Goods .019G -.0143 .0788 -.0155 -.0475 .0518
1.4073 -.52G1 2.6491 -.5666 -1.7010 2.4721
Oth. Serv. -.2348 .0550 -.1471 .1545 .0274 .0336
-5.G1G0 .G774 -1.6510 1.8841 .3275 .5352
Loglikelihood - 3769.192. The figures show the estimated ccefficients and the ccefficients
divided by their estimated asymptotic standard errors.19



















ai bi ~il ~i2 ~i9 ~i4
-.001G .1150 -.1233 .0362 .0126 -.0010
-2.3449 6.9746 -11.0301 3.9227 1.1458 -.0930
.0002 .0919 .0149 -.0547 -.0144 -.0116
.3445 6.7574 1.5205 -6.7501 -1.4859 -1.2569
.0032 .0642 .0376 .0162 -.0777 .0041
5.3123 4.7438 3.8015 2.0004 -7.9706 .4408
.0003 .0112 .0103 .0058 .0216 -.0055
.9828 .8310 1.1151 .7805 2.4975 -.6588
.0005 .0957 -.0207 .0194 -.0106 -.0091
1.1710 8.4605 -2.7450 3.1021 -1.4055 -1.2644
-.0035 .1465 .0512 -.0149 .0367 -.0023
-8.0144 13.2415 7.5416 -2.6543 5.2238 -.3524
-.0067 .3161 .0297 -.0102 .0538 .0518
-6.3992 15.8247 1.9622 -.7849 3.5796 3.5974
.0036 .1071 .0012 .0001 .0168 -.0006
6.7486 12.1959 .1601 .0097 2.2170 -.0874
.0040 .0523 -.0008 .0022 -.0389 -.0259
3.9862 3.6572 -.0603 .1969 -3.1057 -2.2648
~i5 ~i6 ~i7 ~i8 ~i9
.0527 -.0024 .0379 -.0253 .0127
3.1979 -.1128 2.5648 -1.3518 .8095
.0167 -.0085 .0099 -.0144 .0621
1.1967 -.9440 .7924 -.9055 4.8760
.0586 -.0714 -.0151 .0374 .0103
9.1154 -3.6810 -1.2265 2.2841 .7363
.0225 -.0309 -.0136 .0283 -.0385
1.7759 -1.8306 -1.1569 1.9839 -3.3101
-.0204 .0090 .0207 .0072 .0045
-1.8562 .6046 2.0568 .5736 .4268
-.0278 -.0736 -.0071 .0354 .0024
-2.8083 -5.2995 -.7805 3.0647 .2352
-.0969 .0636 -.1003 .0121 -.0036
-4.3711 2.13R8 -.5.3Fi63 .4RR0 -.1793
.0027 .0470 .0172 -.0875 .00:1]
.2447 3.3623 1.8187 -7.5325 .3486
-.0081 .0671 .0505 .0068 -.0530
-.4576 2.9792 3.2564 .3624 -3.7452
Loglikelihood - 3991.885. The figures show the estimated ccefficients and the ccefficients
divided by their estimated asymptotic standard errors.20











a~ Ó~ C~L C~q C(3 C~~
-.0016 .08ï2 -.0978 .0085 -.0051 -.0172
-2.6933 5.9778 -8.9539 .9679 -.5964 -1.6785
.0008 .0686 .0221 -.0697 -.0053 -.0168
1.4094 5.2377 2.2520 -8.8077 -.6852 -1.8289
.0037 .0611 .0230 .0221 -.0810 .0010
6.1440 9.1626 2.0913 2.4931 -9.4063 .0990
.0007 .0105 .0073 .0108 .0069 .0044
1.4619 .8704 .8127 1.4853 .9723 .5187
.0006 .0967 -.0169 .0107 -.0019 -.0002
1.4894 9.7633 -2.2758 1.7857 -.3209 -.0274
-.0033 .1487 .0456 -.0093 .0214 .0053
-7.4829 13.7137 5.6183 -1.4195 3.3675 .6951
-.0063 .3044 .0427 .0066 -.0087 .0349
-6.8018 13.35ï6 2.5024 .4822 -.6515 2.1796
A045 .0879 -.0176 .OlfiB .0319 .0048
8.6ï59 fi.863fi -1.8342 2.1745 4.2393 .5389
.0010 .1349 -.0084 .0034 A418 -.Ol fi2
1.3970 R.0527 -.6705 .3400 4.2557 -1.3775
c~s c~s c~~ cs c;e
.0240 -.0005 .0138 .0286 .0458
1.5581 -.0279 .9323 1.7047 3.7480
Drink~Tob. .0259 -.0124 .0130 -.0006 .0438
1.8772 -.7289 .9782 -.0387 3.9991
}lousing .0312 -.0173 -.0118 .0129 .0200
2.0204 -.9048 -.7962 .7623 1.6295
Fuel~Light .0191 -.0034 -.0219 .0045 -.0227
1.1086 -.2146 -1.7970 .3274 -2.2535
Clothing -.0210 .0214 .0105 -.0050 .0022
-2.0085 1.6587 1.0478 -.4355 .2711
Durables -.0261 -.0731 -.0026 .0349 .0039
-2.2809 -5.1751 -.2352 2.7980 .4289
Vehicles -.1029 .0146 -.0554 .0586 .0096
-4.2842 .4909 -2.4008 2.2385 .5033
Oth. Goods .0523 .0327 .0290 -.1327 -.0172
3.8779 1.9588 2.2363 -9.0226 -1.6074
Oth. Serv. .0024 .0381 .0255 -.0012 -.0854
.1362 1.7458 1.5024 -.0629 -6.0968
Loglikolihood - 3908.350. The 6gures ahow the estimated coeiticients and the'coelHcients
divided by their estimated asymptotic standard errors.21
TABLE 7: IMPLIED AND ACTUAL ROTTERDAM MODEL COEFFICIENTS
(Adding-up)
No aerial correlation
bi bi Cii Cii Ei Ei rlii llii
Food 0.086 0.118 -0.097 -0.144 0.402 0.549 -0.453 -0.672
Drink~Tob. 0.065 0.270 -0.071 -0.023 0.533 2.216 -0.582 -0.185
Housing 0.063 0.046 -0.079 -0.067 0.518 0.379 -0.650 -0.549
Fuel~Light 0.009 -0.057 0.005 0.133 0.193 -1.225 0.107 2.863
Clothing 0.094 0.269 -0.029 -0.135 1.092 3.124 -0.337 -1.574
Durablea 0.146 0.103 -0.072 -0.009 3.079 2.163 -1.519 -0.187
Vehicles 0.299 -0.060 -0.049 0.026 8.998 -1.817 -1.324 0.781
Ol.h. Coods (1.093 0.211 -0.126 -0.172 0.643 1A55 -0.871 -1.191
Otli. Serv. 0.195 U.102 -0.076 -0.118 0.787 0.551 -0.412 -0.643
Serial correlation
bi bi Cii Cii Ei Ei rÍii nii
Food 0.128 0.128 -0.190 -0.088 0.598 0.598 -0.654 -0.409
Drink~Tob. 0.089 0.052 -0.057 -0.077 0.730 0.427 -0.467 -0.629
llousing 0.063 0.076 -0.075 -0.032 0.518 0.625 -0.617 -0.265
Fucl~Light 0.012 0.019 -0.008 -0.015 0.258 0.403 -0.172 -0.324
Clothing 0.092 0.107 -0.030 -0.072 1.069 1.245 -0.349 -0.834
Durables 0.144 0.144 -0.070 -0.069 3.037 3.031 -1.476 -1.460
Vehicles 0.315 0.261 -0.102 -0.074 9.480 7.845 -3.070 -2.234
Oth. Goods 0.108 0.141 -0.086 -0.102 0.746 0.971 -0.594 -0.708
Oth. Serv. 0.048 0.073 -0.056 -0.108 0.260 0.397 -0.304 -0.58622
FOOTNOTES
1. I wish to thank A.P. Barten and the participants of the Econometrics Seminar at CentER for
lielpful comments. Any error is my own.
2. if R~ denotes the j-th matrix of autocorrelation ccefficients in the jul! system, we have:
R) - (~n ~nxl)Rj(~n - in)~.
In the sequcl, we denote by I, an identity matrix oforder r, by Orx, a null matrix with r rows
and s columns, and by :, a column vector of r ones. "vec" denotea the stack operator and
"tr" denotes trace. The identities vec (ABC) - (C' ~ A)vec B and tr (AB) -(vec A')'vec B
will be used repeatedly.
3. Following Breusch and Pagan (1980), we interpret the expectations in Zy~ and Z~~ as being
conditional on Ul.
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